The Tragedy of Donella Meadow’s Thinking in Systems.
This week, I’ve been reading Donella Meadow’s Thinking in Systems, because I wanted to wrap my head around the ideas that involve systems thinking and understand it better. And until about halfway through the book, it was holding to some pretty basic examples, and it was doing a fine job of convincing me that it had valuable ideas.
There was one thing that gave me pause, but it wasn’t about her thinking. She writes about New England forestry, and how ever since the Civil War the industry there has experience a predictable 40-year cycle of boom and bust, because the entire industry is trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma: either they over-log and destroy the forests’ ability to produce lumber at a steady state, or they’re out-bid by their competitors who over-log, go under, and get bought by those some competitors. In hard times, some of them go under anyway, get bought, and create larger holdings, until those holdings are shattered by bankruptcy in the next cycle.
In this story, I want to understand the system that creates this problem: the political forces that prevent the lumber industry from collectively reaching an optimal “steady state” of forestry.
The book states that there are four common meta-states for any exploitation of a natural resource:
- an unharvested condition, in which humans aren’t exploiting it, and it produces at maximum
- the optimal harvest, in which we harvest from it at a state that leaves it capable of sustaining itself. It produces less than its natural state, but as much as it can and produce a constant harvest for humans.
- an over harvest, in which we harvest too much, its ability to reproduce new resources is damaged, the harvesters experience their own cut-back as a result, and then the resource recovers and new harvesters move in. This is the oscillating state.
- an excessive harvest, in which so much of the resource is cut out that it cannot recover, not in a meaningful amount of time as humans understand it. This is the collapsed state.
About halfway through the book, though, Meadows does start to get into the political questions that influence such systems, and this is where I wanted to throw the book against the wall.
Because Garett Hardin
Because she quotes Garett Hardin approvingly and enthusiastically, and she embraces his ideas.
Garrett Hardin wrote The Tragedy of the Commons. Most people have heard of it, but I’m going to tell you something you may not know: “The tragedy of the commons” did not, historically, exist. When Hardin wrote his essay, he invented the idea out of whole cloth, and his examples were entirely hypothetical.
Hardin invented the idea, and his examples, because he hated Black people.
Hardin was a straight up, unrepentant, loud and proud white supremacist. Meadows paraphrases one of his most offensive examples. She writes: “If every family can have any number of children it wants, but society as a whole has to support the cost of education, health care, and environmental protection for all children, the number of children born can exceed the capacity of society to support them all. (This is the example that caused Hardin to write his article.)”
It’s that parenthetical that caused my Book, Meet Wall moment.
Hardin wrote those ideas at a time when conversations about “How Black People Were Gonna Outbreed White People” was a part of daily conservative discourse. It was a meme that existed everywhere in the 1960s in rural and conservative America. It was on the radio, it was in church newsletters, it was every goddamned place. Hardin wrote The Tragedy of the Commons to convince white people not to succumb to an empathetic view of Black people, but instead that we, the master race, should be prepared for ecological disaster and must be prepared to “throw the lesser races overboard” if civilization was to survive. In the meantime, welfare and school lunches and all that were just setting the stage for making that collapse happen sooner.
Meadows is quoting that idea, and does so approvingly.
Commons were real. Tragedies about them aren’t.
“But the tragedy of the commons, that’s real, isn’t it?”
No. It’s not. When you say that, you’re “thinking like a state,” as historian James Scott puts it.
Go back to before the invention of capitalism and the regulatory state. The word “commons” is the antithesis of what you and I call a “resource.” A commons was a shared communal source of subsistence that everyone within walking distance of it recognized as their responsibility to nurture. Grazing land, water, timber, fishing, game, all the natural resources that could be over-harvested were managed by local collective consensus to ensure that they weren’t. The means for deciding how that resources was shared, harvested, and accounted were local, idiosyncratic, tied up in the local history and local ecology, often unwritten, and based on there being little inequality among the families involved in the commons’ sustainability.
Commons weren’t “tragic”; commons (the resource and the communal awareness of it) were literally the means by which a town-and-farm community tied to a valley, to a region of arable land, to a river, or to a seafront, managed to keep themselves alive for generation after generation.
That’s what a commons is.
Several inventions combined in the 18th century to destroy the commons: gunpowder gave princes a far greater reach over which to impose their will; cartography and the new sciences of measurement and statistics gave those same princes the ability to “understand” their realm as a physical entity; and finally the invention of the limited liability corporation, the ability to impose one’s will at a distance using only money, created a relationship between princes and their banks that required a steady, reliable, comprehensible and uniform way of accounting for it all. The commons, with their local, quirky, “nobody owns that, how will you tax that?” nature, had to go. It all had to be standardized so the state’s accountants could account for it.
The commons were enclosed: parceled off and privatized. Formally recognized as belonging to the local lordling, not the people who depended on it. Rents could be extracted, and resources could be mined, and if the resource was exhausted, oh well, that’s not the lordling’s concern; he just needs money, he doesn’t have to be too concerned with how the peasants get it.
The Benefit of the Doubt
Hardin took a word and turned it into an attack on minorities because he thought they were “lesser races” who didn’t deserve the “largesse” of white people (it wasn’t largesse at all; black slaves built a lot of the 19th century USA and didn’t get paid for it, and white people continue to reap benefits from what those black hands built).
Meadows quotes not just Hardin’s erroneous idea, but Hardin’s vicious racist reasoning behind the idea, couched in a generic language that belies the conversation Hardin was participating in, and makes it central to one of the points she’s making.
She goes further, too, quoting Hardin’s three “alternatives” to tragedy: Educate, Privatize, and Regulate. She writes:
Some “primitive” cultures have managed common resources effectively for generations through education and exhortation. Garrett Hardin does not believe that option is dependable, however. Common resources protected only by tradition or an “honor system” may attract those who do not respect the tradition or who have no honor. Privatization works more reliably than exhortation…
As Ivan Illich has pointed out (note: PDF), those “primitives” didn’t manage through education and exhortation; they managed through regulation, on a local scale. Meadows is giving in to modern thinking here, trapped in her own experiences about how natural resources are created and distributed. Local communities had a fixed and limited range; even with good roads, an ox-drawn wagon can’t travel more than 80 miles before the animal has eaten more food than the wagon can profitably haul, and that’s been part of the human condition since the invention of the ox-drawn wagon. Privatization is a modern and radical change in the way people use and think about natural resources, and during the European transition of the 19th century hundreds of thousands of peasants were transformed from “stewards of the land” into wage laborers, cast into poverty, and often left to starve.
I really, really want to believe this is a case of naivete. Meadows died in 2001, so we can’t ask her, but her general politics in the book is a fairly anodyne liberal sort, with comfortable nods toward alternative families and abortion rights and so forth. And I really want to believe that her editors, who were all academics of the economic, macro-sociological sort, were unfamiliar with the context or meaning behind Hardin’s work.
An egregious and offensive error this big damages any arguments the book might be making. And that’s unfortunate, because the basics about systems thinking, its purpose, modeling, and uses, are really valuable and generic. I just wish I hadn’t hit this speedbump, or that she’d written it quite so enthusiastically.